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PATENTS
SYNERGISM AND NONOBVIOUSNESS: THE TENTH CIRCUIT
ENTERS THE FRAY
INTRODUCTION
The federal courts of appeals are in conflict on the standard to be used
to determine the patentability of "combination" patents under the statutory
nonobviousness requirement for patent validity. As distinguished from an
entirely new innovation, a "combination" is the product of using or uniting
commonly known devices together to function as one complete apparatus.
When the overall effect of the combination produces an unpredictable
change from the individual components' functions, the result is termed "syn-
ergistic." Synergism then is the combining of known elements to produce a
unique result.'
In essence, the question dividing the appellate courts is whether syner-
gism is a necessary result that must be achieved by combination patents
under the guidelines for determining nonobviousness established by the
Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. 2 In Graham, the Supreme Court
interpreted the statutory nonobviousness requirement and announced that
this prerequisite to patentability was to be evaluated under objective stan-
dards. The Graham nonobviousness standards provide that in determining
patent validity, the patent must be examined in light of the prior art as it
existed at the time the innovation was developed. Additionally, three fac-
tual inquiries must be undertaken by the reviewing court: 1) the nonobvi-
ousness considerations in view of the prior art; 2) the differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue; and 3) the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art.
3
The present controversy among the circuits centers around the applica-
bility of the synergism doctrine to combination patents. The synergism ap-
proach is a digression to an earlier, subjective standard of "invention"
previously imposed by the courts before the advent of the statutory nonobvi-
ousness criteria. This split between the circuits developed from language
contained in the Supreme Court's decisions in Anderson's-Black Rock Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co.,4 and Sakraida v. Ag Pro Inc.
5
In holding that the patents at issue were invalid for failing to meet the
statutory nonobviousness requirement, the Supreme Court, in these cases,
obliquely referred to the word "synergism" to describe the result achieved by
1. According to THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY at 1305 (1969), synergism is
"[t]he action of two or more substances ... to achieve an effect of which each is individually
incapable."
2. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
3. Id. at 17.
4. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
5. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
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a combination patent. Without the benefit of further elaboration by the
Supreme Court, either specifically endorsing a synergism standard or pre-
scribing tests for its application, many of the lower federal courts adopted
the term and employed it as a measure for combination patents. As most, if
not all, patents contain combinations of old or known elements, the use of
the criterion has vast implications for restricting the scope of patentable in-
novations.
The confusion that now exists among the circuits is exemplified by the
1979 Tenth Circuit decisions. In the August 1979 decision of Plastic Container
Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Oklahoma, Inc.,6 the Tenth Circuit, in an opinion
written by Judge Robert Miller, 7 held that synergism was not a requirement
for the nonobviousness test. In remanding the case to the district court for
consideration of the nonobviousness issue, the court stressed that only the
guidelines espoused in Graham are determinative of the question of nonobvi-
ousness. A premise of the Plastic opinion was that "Congress expressly man-
dated nonobviousness, not synergism, as the sole test for the patentability of
novel and useful inventions. . . . [A]s section 103 [of the 1952 Patent Act]
applies to all patent claims, there is no justification why patentability of a
combination patent should be measured by a different standard than any
other type of invention."8 Conversely, the May 1979 opinion in True Temper
Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp.,9 written by Judge Holloway, stated without ex-
planatory comment that synergism was required. "A combination of known
elements may be patentable, but the result in such a case must be truly syn-
ergistic. Combination patents are subjected to a scrutiny 'proportioned to
the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old
elements.' ,"t In the March 1979 decision of Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp.,
I
the court, in an opinion written by Judge Doyle, held that for the combina-
tion of old elements to be patentable, a synergistic effect must be achieved.
This note argues that the Tenth Circuit in Plastic correctly rejected the
requirement of synergism in combination patents. In evaluating the impact
of the Supreme Court decisions of Black Rock and Sakraida on the synergism
question in the appellate circuits, a review of recent decisions of each circuit
will be undertaken.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONOBVIOUSNESS STANDARD
The Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power . ..To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries .... ,,'2 Patent law, founded on this constitutional
clause, rewards inventors by conferring a limited monopoly for their innova-
6. 607 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 100 S. Ct. 672 (1980).
7. Judge Robert Miller, of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sat
by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 293(a) (1976).
8. 607 F.2d at 905 n.48.
9. 601 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1979).
10. Id. at 506.
11. 593 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 75 (1980).
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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tions that achieve actual invention status. 13 The accepted argument for pro-
viding patent protection is to encourage the discovery of new technology.'
4
This incentive to the inventor, the exclusive utilization of the patent, is
weighed against the public's interest in access to new technology. In balanc-
ing these conflicting interests, the interest which furthers the notion of a fed-
eral constitutional mandate for a competitive economy, in theory, should
prevail. 15 In view of the Constitution's grant of authority to Congress to
award a proprietary monopoly, the patent monopoly should prevail. The
long range interests of providing incentives to the inventor are greater, there-
fore, than the public's short range interest in access.
In accordance with the constitutional grant of authority and with these
policy considerations in mind, Congress established the statutory prerequi-
sites for patentability. These requirements include three primary tests of in-
vention: utility, 16 novelty, 17 and nonobviousness. 8 Historically, utility was
the only measure of a patent's validity. The Patent Act of 1790 granted
13. The patent owner has the exclusive right to manufacture, distribute, license, or sell the
patent for a term of 17 years. After this term, the patented innovation is dedicated to the
public. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
14. In exchange for this proprietary monopoly, a patent claim must describe the patent in
such a manner that knowledge of the patent can be shared with the world.
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor 6f carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
15. The operation of federal patent . . . laws is assumed to advance the federal com-
petitive mandate. Each law grants a proprietary monopoly over subject matter that,
but for the grant, would lie in the public domain. The Constitution's authorization to
Congress to grant patent and copyright protection represents a judgment that, al-
though short range competitive interests would benefit from immediate and free pub-
lic access to technological and artistic innovation, to permit such access would destroy
incentive to innovate; new products and works would not be introduced into the mar-
ket and consequently the long range competitive situation would decline.
Goldstein, The Compettive Mandate.- From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 873, 878 (1971).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) reads: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful proc-
ess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
17. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) reads:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless---
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States . ...
18. Nonobviousness, long a condition for obtaining a patent in American law, means
that an invention must not have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to
which the subject matter of the invention pertains at the time of the invention and in
the light of the teachings of the prior art. Nonobviousness is distinct from novelty in
the sense that an invention may be obvious even though it is not identically disclosed
anywhere in the prior art.
The general purpose behind the requirement of nonobviousness is the same as
that behind the requirement of novelty. It serves to limit patent monopolies to those
innovations that in fact serve to advance the state of the useful arts. New problems
arise and call for new solutions. A patent monopoly may issue only for those literally
new solutions that are beyond the grasp of the ordinary artisan who had a full under-
standing of the pertinent prior art.
2 D. CHISOLM, PATENTS § 5.01 (1978).
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patents for innovations that were useful and important.1 9 That test inquired
as to whether the invention actually worked or did a better job than earlier
devices.20 Three years later, the standard of novelty was added. 2' This cri-
terion was a measure of the innovation's "newness." Novelty determined if
the innovation existed in written form or if it was in actual public use prior
to the time the patent was sought. 22 Thus, the early test of patentability was
whether the innovation was "new and uset-Ul.'
23
Before the institution of the nonobviousness requirement, the judiciary
espoused a third standard: that the innovation had to be an "invention."
The Supreme Court case originating the patentability standard of "inven-
tion" was Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.24 In rejecting the validity of the patent, the
Court found that although the replacement of wooden door handles with
ceramic knobs was new, the elements of the improved doorknob were old
and well known and devoid of the ingenuity of invention. Distinguishing
between those innovations that were patentable and those that were not, the
Court stressed that
unless more ingenuity and skill . . . than . . . [that] possessed by
an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business [was required]
• . . there . . . [would be] an absence of that degree of skill and
ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention.
In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechan-
ic, not that of the inventor.
25
Construing this standard, however, proved the word "invention" to be a
term of legal art. As the Supreme Court subsequently noted, "the truth is
[that] the word [invention] cannot be defined in such manner as to afford
any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device involves an
exercise of the inventive faculty or not."
'26
The courts, nevertheless, continued to use the "invention" standard,
and the judicial construction of "invention" evolved into an increasingly se-
vere test. The culmination of this strict scrutiny is illustrated in Cuno Engi-
19. Patent Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790).
20. In the famous "useless steroid" case, Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), the
Supreme Court rejected the patent of a chemical steroid because the specification of the patent
claims did not indicate any use for the steroid. Until such time as there was an actual use for
the steroid, no patent would be granted. The claimed innovation had failed the test of useful-
ness.
21. 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
22. See Note, Novelty and Reduction to Practice.- Patent Confusion, 75 YALE L.J. 1194 (1966).
23. See Rich, tPhnzctes of Patentabiliy, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 393 (1960).
24. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
25. Id. at 266. The rationale for this judicially sanctioned third test is that an implicit
limitation on the constitutional grant of authority to confer patent status requires that it be
given only to those innovations that contribute to the public knowledge. Thus, when the contri-
bution to public knowledge is insubstantial, such that anyonq familiar with the technology
could have accomplished the same result, no monopoly should be granted.
26. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 427 (1891). The Supreme Court further stated:
Courts, adopting fixed principles as a guide, have by a process of exclusion determined
that certain variations in old devices do or do not involve invention; but whether the
variation relied upon in a particular case is anything more than ordinary mechanical
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neering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,27 wherein the Supreme Court further
restricted the scope of patents by proposing the "flash of creative genius"
test. 28 In this case, the patent advanced the state of the art of automobile
cigarette lighters with the addition of cordless, thermostatically-controlled
heat. 29 Although the Court conceded that the patent combination was "new
and useful," 30 it instructed that "the new device, however useful it may be,
must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling."
'3'
Echoing this strict standard for patentability, the Supreme Court in
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.32 reversed the
decisions of both the district court 33 and the court of appeals 34 and held the
patent under consideration to be invalid. The patent involved a grocery
cashier's counter that contained a rack for manually moving the groceries
over the counter from the customer to the cashier. 35 At the initial adjudica-
tion of the patent claim, the district court found that although each element
of the patent was known in the prior art, the blend was "a decidedly novel
feature and constitute[d] a new and useful combination."'36 The Supreme
Court reversed. In determining that the patent was invalid, the Supreme
Court held that "[tihe conjunction or concert of known elements must con-
tribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its
parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable. ' 37 Further, the Court
cautioned the lower tribunals that "courts should scrutinize combination
patent claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of
finding invention in an assembly of old elements."
'38
27. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
28. Id. at 91. According to one commentator, the judicial evolution towards the strict tests
of patentability came not from
any authoritative break from established guidelines that produced these shifts, but
only the slightest nuance in wording. For example, although the trend toward find-
ings of invalidity which followed on the heels of Cuno has been attributed to the
Court's adoption there of a test that, to be patentable, subject matter must stem from
a "flash of creative genius," Curo, in fact, reflects no intention to replace, or even to
augment, the objective Hotchkirs standard with a subjective measure. Cuno's purport-
edly new test of invention actually dates back to Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mifg.
Co., 113 U.S. 59 (1885); and, as in Httollister, the term was used in an offhand way to
describe the opposite of what Hotchkis called ordinary skill. Had Justice Douglas in-
stead coined a term such as "extraordinary skill," the lower courts would probably
have imputed to it, too, a high, subjective requirement.
Cooch, The Standards oflnvention tn the Courts, in DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 34, 56 (W.
Ball ed. 1960).
29. 314 U.S. at 87.
30. Id. at 90.
31. Id. at 91.
32. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
33. Bradley v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 78 F. Supp. 388 (ED. Mich. 1948).
34. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 179 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1950).
35. 340 U.S. at 149.
36. Id. (quoting from the district court's opinion).
37. Id. at 152.
38. Id. The rationale for this scrutiny was that
the function of a patent is to add to the sum of useful knowledge. Patents cannot be
sustained when, on the contrary, their effect is to subtract from former resources freely
available to skilled artisans. A patent for a combination which only unites old ele-
ments with no change in their respective functions, such as is presented here, obviously
withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the
resources available to skillful men.
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In essence then, the lack of precision of the invention standard and the
increasingly strict tests resulted in an inconsistent body of law producing
subjective reviews of patent applications by the courts.
39
In the Patent Act of 1952,40 Congress, cognizant of the widening dispar-
ity in judicial decisions on patents, added a third requirement of nonobvi-
usness. 41  An invention :S r1-Vsj ald a patent may not be obtained
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art. Patentability shall not be nega-
tived by the manner in which the invention was made.
42
The standard of nonobviousness embodied in section 103 was intended
to advance certainty and uniformity in adjudicating patent claims. 43 The
standard has not yet achieved that goal. An initial source of disagreement
developed among the circuits concerning whether section 103 altered the
previous judicial standard of "invention. '44 Several circuits interpreted the
section to mean that the criterion was intended only to codify the judicial
standards in use at the time of its enactment. 45 These judicial standards
were extremely strict and posed a difficult hurdle for the patent seeker to
clear. Another interpretation was that the nonobviousness standard rein-
stated the more liberal test of Hotchkzss-that the level of patentability was
merely something more than that which would easily have been discerned
by a mechanic skilled in that field.
46
To resolve this division among the circuits, the Supreme Court inter-
Id. at 152-53.
39. This lack of consistency prompted one commentator to note:
In the final analysis, all it amounted to was that if the court thought the inven-
tion, though new and useful, was not patentable, then it did not involve "invention"
and vice versa. The requirement of "invention" was the plaything of the judges who
as they became initiated into its mysteries, delighted to devise and expound their own
ideas of what it meant; some very lovely prose resulting.
Rich, supra note 23, at 404.
40. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976).
41. Id. § 103.
42. Id.
43. The Revision Notes provide:
There is no provision corresponding to the first sentence explicitly stated in the
present statutes, but the refusal of patents by the Patent Office, and the holding of
patents invalid by the courts, on the ground of lack of invention or lack of patentable
novelty has been followed since at least as early as 1850. This paragraph is added with
the view that an explicit statement in the statute may have some stabilizing effect, and
also to serve as a basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria which may be
worked out.
The second sentence states that patentability ags to this requirement is not to be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made, that is, it is immaterial
whether it resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) (Historical and Revision Notes).
44. Set D. CHISOLM, supra note 18, § 5.02(4); Note, The Standards of Patentabity-Judicial
Interpretation of Section 103 of the Patent Act, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 306 (1963); Note, The Impact of the
Supreme Court Section 103 Cases on the Standard of Patentability in the Lower Fedral Courts, 35 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 818 (1967).
45. Hawley Prod. Co. v. U.S. Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1958); Kwikset Locks, Inc.
v. Hillgren, 210 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1954).
46. Judge Learned Hand opined that Congress intended section 103 to signal a return to
the Hotchkiss v. Greenwood test of "obviousness to a skilled mechanic" and to repudiate the stricter
[Vol. 58:2
1981] SYNERGISM AND NONOBVIOUSNESS
preted the nonobviousness standard of section 103 in the leading case of Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co. 4 7  Endorsing the preferred terminology of
nonobviousness over the "invention" standard, the Court opined that non-
obviousness was intended to embrace the judicial decisions which had fol-
lowed the Hotchkiss test, which test required an innovation to exhibit a high
level of skill and ingenuity as a prerequisite to the issuance of patent.48 Ad-
vocating the Hotchk'ss criterion the Court expressly abolished the "flash of
creative genius" test used in Cuno.49 The Supreme Court continued its anal-
ysis of section 103 by asserting that, although nonobviousness is a question of
law, resolution of this requirement rests upon factual inquiries.50 The Court
posited that each of the three factual inquiries must be met under section
103. The scope and content of the prior art are to be determined, the differ-
ences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained, and
the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art is to be resolved. 51 The Court
concluded that "strict observance of the requirements laid down here will
result in that uniformity and definiteness which Congress called for in the
1952 Act.'
5 2
The three-pronged test that the Court proposed did set out a systematic
method of analysis for assessing an invention's patentability according to the
nonobviousness standard. The Court stated, however, that section 103 "was
not intended by Congress to change the general [high] level of patentable
invention." 53 As indicated by the increasing degree of strictness in the judi-
judicial standards that had developed. Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 536
(2d Cir. 1955).
In Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960), Judge Hand again stated that in
considering the congressional intent of section 103
there can be no doubt that the Act of 1952 meant to change the slow but steady drift
of judicial decision that had been hostile to patents . . . . We cannot escape that
conclusion . . . that Congress deliberately meant to restore the old definition, and to
raise it from a judicial gloss to a statutory command.
Id. at 503.
47. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
48. Id. at 17.
Hotchkzss established that invention was a prerequisite to patentability, and fur-
ther, espoused a test for determining whether invention existed. Therefore, Hotchklos
established two distinct things: an invention reqfirement and an invention test.
Under section 103 there is no longer an invention requirement for patentability;
rather, section 103 only establishes a nonobviousness test for patentability based on the
Hotchkiss invention test. The only necessary finding under section 103 is that the pat-
ented object would not have been obvious to a man of ordinary skill in the art at the
time it was discovered; a finding of invention, however, is not required.
Note, Nonobvtorenss in Patent Law.- A Question of Law or Fact?, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 612, 621
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Nonobviousness].
49. 383 U.S. at 15. The Court asserted, in a footnote, that the phrase "flash of creative
genius" has been misunderstood. "Although some writers and lower courts found in the lan-
guage connotations as to the frame of mind of the inventors, none were so intended. The opin-
ion approved Hotchkiss specifically, and the reference to 'flash of creative genius' was but a
rhetorical embellishment of language going back to 1833." Id. at 15-16 n.7.
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id. See Nonobvujosness, supra note 48.
52. 383 U.S. at 18.
53. Id. at 17. The Court also noted the relevance of "secondary considerations" in resolv-
ing the issue of obviousness. "Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt
but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or
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cial evolution of patentability determinations, even among those courts as-
serting adherence to the Hotchkiss principles, the Graham Court did not
elucidate the exact standard to be used. Rather than clarifying whether sec-
tion 103 was intended to codify or overrule the severe judicial decisions prior
to the 1952 Act, the Court's decision contributed to the confusion of the
patentability standard. Furthermore, since Graham did not differentiate be-
tween new innovations and combinations or improvements of earlier innova-
tions, many courts adhered to judicial pronouncements made prior to the
advent of section 103. These decisions distinguished combination patents
from new technology and have held combination patents to a higher level of
patentability.
54
II. A DIFFERENT STANDARD FOR COMBINATION PATENTS: THE
SYNERGISM QUESTION
In Anderson's-Black Rock Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 55 the Supreme Court
reviewed section 103 as it applied to a combination patent in which each of
the component elements was known in the prior art. The patent consisted of
a technique for using a radiant energy generator with an asphalt paving
machine to seal joints between asphalt strips.56 In this case, the Court ad-
hered to the guidelines it had developed in Graham.57 Using this analysis,
the Court held the patent invalid because "the combination was reasonably
obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art."158 Although in the course of its
discussion the Court noted that a combination "may result" in a synergistic
effect, it went on to hold that the device in question "was not an invention
by the obvious-nonobvious standard." 59
In Sakrazda v. Ag Pro, Inc. ,60 the Supreme Court, reversing the Fifth Cir-
cuit, 6 ' affirmed the finding of the district court that the patent was invalid
for obviousness. The patent in question was for a new water flush system to
remove animal wastes from dairy barn floors. 62 In this decision the Supreme
Court reasoned that the patent lacked the quality of "invention" as defined
by Hotchkiss, because the patent was obvious to one skilled in the art.63 In
nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevance." Id. at 17-18 (citing Note, Subtests of "Non-
obviousness" A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1964)).
54. See text accompanying notes 95-172 infra.
55. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
56. Id. at 59.
57. Id. at 61-62.
58. Id. at 60.
59. Id. at 61.
We conclude that while the combination of old elements performed a useful func-
tion, it added nothing to the nature or quality of.the radiant-heat burner already
patented. We conclude further that to those skilled in the art the use of the old ele-
ments in combination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious standard. Use
of the radiant-heat burner in this important field marked a successful venture. But as
noted, more than that is needed for invention.
Id. at 62-63. See Note, After Black Rock. New Tests of Patentabili--The Old Tests of lwention, 39
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123 (1970).
60. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
61. 512 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
62. 425 U.S. at 274.
63. Id. at 279.
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an incongruous juxtaposition, the Court first noted that the standard of ob-
viousness had been interpreted in Graham, but it then proceeded to cite with
approval the Great Atlantic & Pactic Tea Co. case for the proposition that
combination patents are to be carefully scrutinized. 64 The standard appar-
ently used to defeat the patent's validity was based on the Graham guidelines.
The Court concluded that the scope of the prior art included all elements of
the patent and that the combination of these elements was "the work of the
skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor." 65 The Court again digressed
from the Graham test, stating that because the patent did not result in a new
or different function, it failed the test for patentability of combination pat-
ents.
66
The controversy among the circuits has centered around the require-
ment that a synergistic result be achieved for combination patents to comply
with the nonobviousness prerequisite to patentability under section 103.
The basis for this division is that the synergism requirement would mandate
that combination patents follow a different standard than the criteria estab-
lished in Graham. Adherence to the synergism requirement by a reviewing
tribunal would subject the combination patent to a stricter scrutiny than
new inventions. The point of disagreement among the circuits is that this
distinction between combination patents and new inventions was not specifi-
cally addressed in Graham. The essential argument of the courts of appeals
rejecting the synergism requirement is that Graham was the Supreme Court's
definitive interpretation of the statutory nonobviousness section and as such
addressed the patentability of all innovations. The circuits that have fol-
lowed the requirement of a synergistic effect have gleaned their rationale
from the holdings of Black Rock and Sakraida.
The question thus remaining in view of the language and holdings of
Black Rock and Sakraida is whether the Supreme Court advocated that a
combination patent must be synergistic to be nonobvious under section
103.67 The answer is found in the language of both cases. In Black Rock, the
Court stated that "a combination of elements may result in an effect greater
than the sum of the several effects taken separately. No such synergistic re-
sult is argued here." 68 Initially, in the Black Rock opinion, the Court indi-
cated that the combination was "a matter of great convenience" 69 but that it
64. Id. at 281.
65. Id. at 282 (quoting Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (I I How.) at 261).
66. Id. The Court noted that the "patent simply arranges old elements with each perform-
ing the same function it had been known to perform, although with perhaps producing a more
striking result than in previous combinations. Such combinations are not patentable under
standards appropriate for a combination patent." Id. Perhaps the question is, if this patent was
obvious why was it not available sooner, in view of the long felt need and the commercial
success of the innovation?
67. See Note, Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.: Combination Patents Now Require S yergtic Eect , 15
Hous. L. REV. 157 (1977) (criticizing the synergistic effect test); Note, Patentability of Mechanical
Combinations. 4 Defntion of Synergism, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1043 (1979) (reconciling synergism with
the Graham standards); Note, Endorsing the Application of Non-Technical Factual Considerations for
Obviousness Detmnmiations in Combhalton Patent Cases, 10 ToL. L. REV. 1011 (1979) (favoring a
clear choice by Congress of either adopting or abandoning the synergism test).
68. 396 U.S. at 61.
69. Id. at 60.
19811
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did not contain a "new or different function." 70 Most importantly for deter-
mining the synergistic effect question, the Coutrt cited the Graham analysis of
the statutory interpretation of section 103 as binding on the issue of nonobvi-
ousness. 7 1 There is little doubt that if the Court had been proposing an
additional patent test it would have analyzed and differentiated between the
svnergism test and the Graham standards. 72 In fact, it appears that the Court
was not cognizant of the inconsistency of the language it used in Black Rock
or of the potential for digression to a pre-Graham standard.
Similarly, in Sakraida, the Court did not hold that synergism is required
for patentability. 73 The focus of the Court's attention on synergism was di-
rected to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion. The Fifth Circuit had
held that the patent at issue did "achieve a synergistic result. . . . -74 Dis-
missing this contention, the Supreme Court concluded that "[wie cannot
agree that the combination of these old elements . . . can properly be char-
acterized as synergistic, that is, 'result[ing] in an effect greater than the sum
of the several effects taken separately.' -7' Again, however, the Court used
the phrase "new and different function" with a clear implication that combi-
nation patents are subject to a different test from that prescribed in the Great
Atlantic &Pacfic Tea Co. case. This suggestion of a "new and different func-
tion test" is the crux of the division among the circuits.
As previously noted, the Great Atlantic & Pacifc Tea Co. case was the
culmination of an increasingly strict judicial standard of patentability.
7 6
Decided two years before the incorporation of section 103 into the 1952 Pat-
ent Act, the Great Atlantic &Paciic Tea Co. decision held that a combination
patent must "in some way [exceed] the sum of its parts" 77 or, in other words,
the combination must produce or achieve a synergistic result. If the courts of
appeals and the Supreme Court scrutinized combination patents according
to the holding in the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. case, then to be still an
acceptable guideline, this decision should turn on objective tests similar to
those prescribed in Graham. Although the Court in Graham did not address
the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. issue of combination patents, there was
not, either in Graham or in section 103, language indicating that combination
patents are subject to a different or more stringent review than other patent-
able innovations.
Further, although the Great Atlantic & Paciftc Tea Co. Court noted the
improbability of ascertaining invention in a combination of known ele-
70. Id. (quoting Lincoln Eng'r Corp. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938)).
71. Id. at 61-62. See D. CHISOLM, supra note 18, § 5.02(5); Edwards, That Clunsy Word
Nonobojous!, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 3 (1978); Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of Words-Is Evolution in
Legal Thinking Impossible?, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 271, 295 (1978); Schneider, Non-Obviousness, The
Supreme Court, and the Prospects for Stability, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 304 (1978).
. 72. The Patent Office is in agreement with this conclusion. See 949 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
THE U.S. PAT. OFF. No. 1, TM3 (1976).
73. For diametrically opposed views on this argument compare Mintz, The Standard of Patent-
ability in the United States-Another Point of View, 1977 DET. C. L. REv. 755 with Sears, Combination
Patents and 35 USC § 103, 1977 DET. C. L. REv. 83.
74. 474 F.2d at 173.
75. 425 U.S. at 282 (quoting Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 61).
76. See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
77. 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950).
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ments, 78 it did not apply the objective standards of Graham. The Court did
not consider the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between
the prior art and the patent, and the level of skill in that art. 79 Contrary to
the Court's contention, several cases and commentators have noted that
"[flar from being an improbable place to find patentability, the new and
unobvious 'combination' is the usual place for finding it." 80
A case on the question of patentability of a combination of known ele-
ments is United States v. Adams,8 I decided with the Graham decision. In Ad-
ams, the Supreme Court determined that the patent, a combination of old
elements which produced a better battery, was not obvious under the prior
art.8 2 The Court, considering the nonobviousness criteria stated that
to combine [the elements] as did Adams required that a person rea-
sonably skilled in the prior art must ignore [certain teachings of the
art]. . . .This is not to say that one who merely finds new uses for
old inventions by shutting his eyes to their prior disadvantages
thereby discovers a patentable innovation. We do say, however,
that known disadvantages in old devices which would naturally
discourage the search for new inventions may be taken into ac-
count in determining obviousness.
8 3
No mention was made in Adams that the components of the battery must
have produced a synergistic effect. Additionally, the Court concluded that
"[i]t begs the question . . .to state merely that [the patent's elements] were
individually known battery components. If such a combination is novel, the
issue is whether bringing them together as taught by [the inventor] was obvi-
ous in the light of the prior art."'84 The judicial precedent after the enact-
ment of section 103 in 1952 does not support the courts that continue to
follow the Court's Great Atlantic &Pacqic Tea Co. holding. If the Court meant
to pronounce in Sakraida a higher standard for patentability-that of syner-
gism for combination patents-the Court should have specifically enunci-
ated such a standard.
78. Id. at 152.
79. 383 U.S. at 17.
80. Rich, supra note 70, at 296.
If the holding of the Great Atlanttc & Paqcf Tea Co. case is carried to its furthest extreme,
then only those innovations that represent decidedly new technology would be considered wor-
thy of patent protection. This position is clearly contrary to the statutory policy of conferring
patents. See, e.g., Shaw v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 417 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1076 (1970); Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
929 (1961). "It is idle to say that combinations of old eiements cannot be inventions; substan-
tially every invention is from such a 'combination': that is to say, it consists of former elements
in a new assemblage." 285 F.2d at 503.
81. 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
82. Justice White dissented, but he did not file an opinion, 383 U.S. at 52. In his patent,
Adams claimed creation of a nonrechargeable wet electric battery.
83. Id. at 51-52.
84. Id. at 50. The elements of Adams' patented battery were electrodes composed of mag-
nesium and cuprous chloride. When these electrodes were combined, the resulting battery was
only the sum of its parts. The battery did not, under any definition of synergism, produce a
synergistic effect. There was no discussion in the Adams decision that something other than a
better battery, in terms of voltage, capacity, and ability to be water-activated, was patented.
Thus, the focus of the Adams court was placed on the unobviousness of creating (or combining




It could be argued that the Supreme Court did intend to hold combina-
tion patents to a different and stricter standard. In the same year that Sak-
raida was decided, the author of the Sakraida decision, Justice Brennan,
joined Justice White in dissenting from the denial of certiorari in a case in-
volving a district court's ruling of nonobviousness in a combination patent.85
Citing the Great Atlantic & Pacifi Tea Co. decision, the dissenting Justices
asserted that
[w]here the patent claim is for a combination of existing elements,
"[c]ourts should scrutinize [such] claims with a care proportioned
to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an as-
sembly of old elements." When a device consists of a mere aggre-
gation of segments of the prior art, there is an increased danger
that a patent will withdraw into its monopoly what is already
known and add nothing to the sum of useful knowledge. Thus, to
be patentable, a combination of elements must produce something
more than the sum of the pre-existing elements; there must be a syner-
gistic result that i's itself nonobvious.
86
Since the district court had not made any findings that the combination
produced a synergistic result, 87 and because each component of the combi-
nation had previously been used to perform the same function it performed
in the patented device, the dissenting Justices contended that the district
court had "departed from the clear teachings of the Court's prior cases." 88
The dissenters' conclusion certainly was at odds with the Second Circuit's
approval of the district court's analysis. 89 The Second Circuit asserted that
the district court's "lucid and complete opinion. . . properly determined all
of the issues" and that the "record amply supports the finding that the...
patent constituted a major breakthrough in the art. . . and was not antici-
pated by prior patents."
9
Apparently, the other members of the Supreme Court did not agree
with the dissenting Justices' position on the patentability of combinations,
for only Justices White and Brennan dissented from the denial of certio-
rari. 9 1 This lack of concurrence with the dissenting Justices' position was
exemplified in Dann v. Johnston.9 2 In Dann, decided three weeks before Sak-
raida, the briefs of the petitioner9 3 and one of the amitci94 argued that syner-
gism was an essential prerequisite for patentability. Since the patent at issue
was not synergistic, they argued that it was therefore invalid. Justice Mar-
shall, writing the Court's opinion, evaluated the patent claims using only the
Graham analysis, and completely ignored the synergism issue.
85. Roanwell Corp. v. Plantronics, Inc., 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).
86. Id. at 1006 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
87. Plantronics, Inc. v. Roanwell Corp., 403 F. Supp. 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
88. 429 U.S. at 1008.
89. 535 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
90. Id. at 1398.
91. The dissenting Justices indicated that the crowded court docket was the reason the case
was not granted certiorari. 439 U.S. at 1009.
92. 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
93. See Brief for Petitioner at 29, Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
94. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Computer and Bus. Equip. Mfrs. Assoc., at 9, Dann v.
Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
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The undesirable confusion engendered by the Supreme Court's deci-
sions on the question of synergism is amplified by the conflicting standards of
the federal courts of appeals. A review of the appellate decisions of each
circuit 9 5 is necessary to allow the practitioner to appreciate the judicial
schism which has developed.
96
III. JUDICIAL CONTRADICTION: DIVISION AMONG THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS
A. Advocates of the Graham Standardr-Rjecttg the Synergism Test
k
1. The Sixth Circuit
The latest patent decision of the Sixth Circuit, Smith v. 4cme,9 7 reviewed
the synergism question. Acknowledging that the purpose of the synergism
test is to grant patent protection to a combination which contributes new
knowledge to a particular technology, the appellate court concluded, how-
ever, that synergism is not a separate test for determining patentability. 98 In
a curious analysis of the Black Rock and Sakraida decisions, the court opined
that "the Supreme Court has recognized synergism to a limited extent as a
term symbolizing the more stringent standard for combination patent
claims." 99 Explaining this statement, the appellate court held that a combi-
nation patent must contribute to mankind's store of knowledge. Further, the
court asserted that if the synergism test were applied to reduce the emphasis
on the Graham standards, synergism would be rejected as an inappropriate
measure of patentability.°° The apparent inconsistency in the Sixth Cir-
cuit's statement that combination patents are subject to a "more stringent
standard" while professing to adhere to the Graham standards is difficult to
reconcile. The court simply may have meant that combination patents re-
quire stricter judicial inquiry to distinguish prior art from new innovations.
Moreover, to speak in terms of a symbolic reminder of the standard of non-
obviousness for combination patents is of questionable judicial value in
adjudicating patent claims. Despite this confusing language, the Sixth Cir-
95. The Fourth Circuit is noticeably absent from the circuit reviews. At the appellate
level, the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the synergism question since the Supreme Court's
Sakrada decision. This review is limited to appellate decisions or significant district court cases
handed down after Sakraida. Although the Fourth Circuit's position on synergism is inconclu-
sive, several Fourth Circuit district court cases adhere to the synergism requirement for patenta-
bility of combination patents. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648,
750-51 (D.S.C. 1977); Joy Mfg. Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 441 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D.W.Va. 1977);
Ward Mach. Co. v. Staley Mach. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 273 (D. Md. 1976).
96. Because of the availability of forum shopping, the division among the appellate courts
is of particular importance to patent attorneys. Depending upon the patent litigation being
contemplated, the attorney should assess the previous holdings of each circuit and file suit in the
circuit where the holdings are most favorable to the client's position.
97. 614 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1980). The earlier decisions by the Sixth Circuit had passively
followed the language in Sakraida. American Seating Co. v. National Seating Co., 598 F.2d 611,
620-21 (6th Cir. 1978); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Acorn Bldg. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 155,
161 (6th Cir. 1977). Seegenerally Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1978).
98. 614 F.2d at 1094.




cuit does consider Graham as the accepted standard of patentability, applica-
ble to both new innovations and combinations.
2. The Seventh Circuit
In the leading case of Republic Industries, Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co.,101 the
Seventh Circuit held that serctinn 103 and the Graham standards comprise the
only criteria for determining nonobviousness. The court reached this con-
clusion after carefully scrutinizing the synergism requirement and rejecting
any vestiges of the use of synergism in evaluating patent claims.'
0 2
In Republc, the Seventh Circuit was asked to determine whether a fire
door, which combined elements of prior art, was patentable. 10 3 Even
though the innovation was the first to unite the known elements, the court,
using the Graham guidelines, found that the combination patent was invalid.
Its rationale was that at the time the combination was made, it would have
been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.'
0 4
Republic was the first case from the courts of appeals that perceptively
analyzed the requirement of synergism. As such, it is a landmark deci-
sion. l05 In considering the synergism question, the Seventh Circuit focused
on two essential inquiries: 1) whether the Supreme Court in Black Rock and
Sakraida advocated a synergism test for combination patents, ' 6 and 2) if so,
whether the synergism test comported with the statutory standards pre-
scribed in section 103 as interpreted in Graham.'0 7 Addressing the first in-
quiry, the appellate court reasoned that because the patent validity issues
presented in both Black Rock and Sakraida were analyzed under the Graham
101. 592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979).
102. A decision by the Seventh Circuit two years before Repubiw had reversed a lower court
ruling of patent validity on the ground that the patent did not produce a synergistic effect. The
appellate decision held that "[u]nless the combination is 'synergistic, that is, result[ing] in an
effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately,' it cannot be patented." St.
Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., 403 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. 11. 1975), rev'd, 549 F.2d 833, 838 (7th Cir.
1977) (citations omitted). The same district judge, Judge Morgan, who had been reversed in S.
Regis, can be credited with a thoughtful analysis of the synergism requirement and of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Black Rock and Sakraida, which persuaded the appellate court to
review its holding in St. Regis. The district court found that the synergism effect test precluded
the measurement of the results achieved by the combination and instead, required that the sum
total of the effect be greater than the sum of the effects of each element taken separately. Addi-
tionally, the district court noted:
As is the case with the Black Rock reference, it is far from clear that Sakraida approved
the principle that "synergistic effect" is the guiding criteria of nonobviousness. The
Court did not so state. It simply refuted the existence of synergistic effect in the partic-
ular combination with which it was there concerned.
Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 433 F. Supp. 666, 671 (S.D. I11. 1977), afd, 592 F.2d
963 (7th Cir. 1979).
103. The patent at issue was a fire door which combined two known elements: 1) a multi-
ple-point hold-open, i., the door could be held open at any point between closed and fully
open positions; and 2) a momentary manual release, ie., the door could self close if slightly
pushed or pulled. 592 F.2d at 966-67.
104. Id. at 975-76.
105. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have followed the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Republic
and rebuked earlier holdings which had embraced the synergism test. The Second, Third, and
Ninth Circuits have empathized with the Republic decision, but have decided cautiously to await
further holdings from the Supreme Court before rejecting the synergism test.
106. 592 F.2d at 967.
107. Id. at 969.
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tripartite standards, neither decision departed from the established patenta-
bility standards, and, consequently, could not be cited as support for the
synergism test.' 0 8 As to the second inquiry, the Seventh Circuit determined
that the synergism test would require a reviewing court to inspect the combi-
nation's operation after the elements were brought together, not at the time
the invention was made. 10 9 The Seventh Circuit asserted that evaluating
the performance of the combination without considering the obviousness of
the combination is not in accordance with the Graham directive to follow
section 103.110 Thus, the cogent conclusion of the Seventh Circuit was that
synergism is not an acceptable test of paten tability. The Seventh Circuit
added, as a final note, that until the Supreme Court or Congress specifically
mandates otherwise, it would continue to apply section 103 and Graham.'"
3. The Tenth Circuit
As noted previously," ' 2 the initial determinations of the Tenth Circuit
on the synergism questions in Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp. 113 and True Temper
Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp. 114 stated without explanatory comment that syner-
gism is a precondition to patentability. Contending that these statements in
the Hesston and True Temper cases were broad dicta, the latest Tenth Circuit
decision, Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Oklahoma, Inc." 1 5 repu-
108. Id. at 968-69.
109. Id. at 971.
110. Id. at 971-72.
111. Id. at 971. For a recent article on this case see Note, Patent Law--Requirementsfor Patent-
abihi,-To Determine Whether a Device that Combines Well-Known Eements, None of Which Performs
Any New or Different Function in the Combination, Is Obvious to a Man of Ordinay Skill A Court Should
Apply the Graham Test and not a Synergy Test-Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592
F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979), 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 110.(1979).
112. See notes 6-11 supra and accompanying text.
113. 593 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1979).
114. 601 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1979). True Temper was discussed in Patents, Trademarks, Copy-
rights, and Unfair Competition, Sixth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 57 DEN. L.J. 305, 310 (1980). The
survey noted that the court in True Temper held that "for a combination of known elements to be
patentable, the result must be synergistic. Since the plaintiff's process took essentially the same
steps in producing rail anchors as did prior art, mere automation of the process was held to be
obvious, i.e., conceivable to a worker of ordinary skill in that industry." Id. at 311-12. Although
the True Temper findings of obviousness of the patent at issue rested essentially on Graham stan-
dards, synergism does not imply that the patented process is conceivable to a person skilled in
the art.
115. 607 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 672 (1980). The other issues
addressed by the court in Plasti were collateral estoppel, see Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of I11. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); intervening rights after patent reissue, see
generaly Dunner & Lipsey, The New Reissue Practice, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 68 (1979); Federico,
Intervening Rights 6n Patent Reissues, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 603 (1962); Note, Equitable Defenses to
a Broadened Reissue Patent, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 229; fraud on the Patent Office, see Cullen &
Vickers, Fraud in the Procurement of a Patent, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 110 (1961); and attorneys
fees, see generally Stroup, Patentee's Monetary Recovey From an Infringer, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 362
(1977); Note, Damages and Account of ProfAs in Trademark, Trade Secrets, Copynght and Patent Law, 3
AUCKLAND U.L. REV. 188 (1977).
The only other patent case decided by the Tenth Circuit in this survey period was Milgo
Electronic Corp. v. United Business Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1980). This
per curiam decision before Judges Barrett, Doyle, and Logan involved a direct infringement suit
concerning a patent which represented a significant new technology and the state of the art in
that field. In a well-reasoned opinion, in which the court addressed the issues of patent validity,
agency relationship, damages, and attorneys fees, the patent was held to be patentable and
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diated the synergism test. In remanding the question of the nonobviousness
of the patent at issue to the district court level, the Tenth Circuit court man-
dated that the analysis of nonobviousness be in accordance with the Graham
standards. Specifically, the appellate court held that the Graham guidelines
"do not require that, for a combination of known elements to be nonobvious,
the result achieved by the combination must be synergistic."' 16 In the
Plastic decision, written by judge Miller, 1 7 the court relied upon the Sev-
enth Circuit's reasoning in Republic for support of the Tenth Circuit's rejec-
tion of the synergism test. Citing the crux of the Seventh Circuit's
repudiation of the synergism requirement, the Tenth Circuit noted that syn-
ergism had not been mentioned either in section 103 or in Graham. The
appellate court further noted the defects in the synergism test, which initially
assumes that the combination of the known elements was obvious. The
court found that the test looks to the performance of the combination after
the invention is complete, not at the time the elements are combined. Be-
cause these defects are inherent in the application of the synergism test, and
because the test does not comport with the statutory prerequisites of patenta-
bility, the Tenth Circuit court rejected the synergism requirement." 8
B. Adherents to the Synergism Test
1. The First Circuit
The First Circuit, without specifically analyzing Black Rock or Sakraida,
has adopted the language of these cases, which cite to the strict Great Atlantic
& Paci/ic Tea Co. test of validity for combination patents. Deciding in favor
of the validity of combination patents in its two most recent patent decisions,
the First Circuit reached both results after finding that each combination
achieved a synergistic effect. The rulings on the nonobviousness question
hinged on the synergistic result; therefore, it is unclear whether this circuit
recognized the synergism test as a separate test for nonobviousness or
whether it used the test to supplement the Graham standards.
In ITTv. Raychem Corp., 1 9 the First Circuit affirmed a lower court rul-
ing which had held that the patent was valid and had been infringed. The
patent involved a wire insulation composed of polyolefin and polyvinylidene
infringed. Because the infringement was willful and flagrant, the court awarded treble damages
in excess of two million dollars. The section of the case devoted to damages is especially instruc-
tive on the evaluation of damages in an infringement suit. On direct patent infringement, see
generaly Harmon, Direct Infringement of Patents, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 739 (1976); Rowland, The
Interplay of the Doctrines of Equivalents and File Wrapper Estoppel, 29 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 917
(1961); Whale, The ABCD's of Patent Infingement, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 136 (1980).
116. 607 F.2d at 904.
117. Judge Miller sat by designation from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. For a
discussion of the viewpoint of the patent judges, see notes 162-67 infa and accompanying text.
118. 607 F.2d at 905 n.48.
119. 538 F.2d 453 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886 (1976). One commentator has argued
that Raychem "skinned the synergism cat: in applying th6 synergism requirement as an interac-
tion between the components of the patent, not as a unique and unexpected result. This type of
application then was similar to the Supreme Court's analysis of nonobviousness in Adams." Ger-
iak, Synergism--The Artificial Bamer to Patentability, in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CON-
DITION OF PATENTABILITY 7:301 to :309 (Witherspoon ed. 1978). The First Circuit,
nevertheless, has continued to analyze patent claims using the synergism requirement.
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fluoride.120 Although the constituents of the wire were well known, the dis-
trict court found that uniting these materials in the wire produced some
unexpected and surprising results.121 ITT, the plaintiff-appellant, asserted
that the patent was obvious because the new insulation was merely a combi-
nation of known materials assembled in a known pattern and exhibiting pre-
dictable characteristics.' 22 On review, citing both the Graham analysis and
the Sakraida language requiring a new and different result in combination
patents, the First Circuit held that the patent was valid. The appellate court
stated that the standard espoused for combination patents is "whether the
new combination 'result(s) in an effect greater than the sum of several effects
taken separately.' 123 Based upon the trial.court's factual findings-that
the temperature rating of the combined insulation was "unpredictably
high," as compared with the individual components, and that the insulation
was unexpectedly flame resistant' 24-the court affirmed the finding that the
requirement of a synergistic effect was met.'
25
The First Circuit applied the strict patentability test in Rosen v. Lawson-
Hemphill,'26 where it affirmed that the patent satisfied the nonobviousness
standard. The appellate court stated that although the combination of the
elements was old, "the combination is patentable if it is based upon an in-
ventive improvement in one of the elements that permits the combination
device to produce a beneficial result never previously obtained.' 27 The
court concluded, in other words, that the combination patent must produce
a synergistic result.
2. The Third Circuit
Although the Third Circuit's initial position was that Sakraida empha-
sized the Graham test of nonobviousness,' 28 the appellate court subsequently
decided, in Sims v. Mack Truck Corp. 129 that combination patents should be
held to a higher standard of patentability. In Sims, the plaintiff alleged that
the patent, which was a change in the discharge location of a concrete mixer
truck from the rear of the vehicle to the front, °3 0 had been infringed. The
district court found that the patent was valid and that it had been in-
120. 538 F.2d at 454.
121. Id. at 456.
122. Id. at 457.
123. Id. (citing Bladk Ro, 396 U.S. at 61, quoted in Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 270).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 549 F.2d 205 (Ist Cir. 1976).
127. Id. at 209.
128. See Systematic Tool & Mach. Co. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 555 F.2d 342 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977). The Third Circuit noted the recent decision of Sakraida by the
Supreme Court, but in analyzing the obviousness of the patent, the circuit court cited that part
of Sakraida which endorsed the Hotchkirs test of the degree of skill and ingenuity exhibited by the
patented innovation. Id. at 347-48. See generally American Sterilizer Co. v. Sybron Corp., 614
F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1980), petitionfor cert.fdted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3039 (U.S. June 6, 1980) (No. 79-1916)
(hinging exclusively on the determination of nonobviousness under the Graham standards); Alu-
minum Co. of Am. v. Amerola Prod. Corp., 552 F.2d 1020, 1027 (3d Cir. 1977).
129. 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1319 (1980).
130. 608 F.2d at 88.
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fringed.131 The Third Circuit reversed.13 2
After sketching the history of the nonobviousness standard, 33 the court
held that both Black Rock and Sakraida stood for the proposition that the
Supreme Court required a higher standard of patentability for combination
patents.' 34 The Third Circuit asserted that "in determining obviousness in a
combination patent [the courts] must undertake the tripartite Graham in-
quiry without losing sight of the necessity to determine whether the device
performs its function in an innovative fashion."' 135 The appellate court con-
cluded that although the third Graham inquiry of obviousness, which re-
quires an analysis and a comparison of the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art with the patented innovation, was the usual measure of patent
validity, a combination patent must, in its total function, produce a more
striking improvement upon the prior art.
In holding that the patent at issue failed to meet the Graham standard
for nonobviousness, the court declined to rule on the question of whether
synergism is a prerequisite to a finding of patent validity.' 36 Aware of the
division of the circuits on the synergism issue, 137 the Third Circuit neverthe-
less posited that the Supreme Court's precedents on combination patents
required these patents to meet a stringent test of patentability.1
38
3. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit is the federal court of appeals from which came the
Sakraida case. 139 In its opinion in Sakraida, the Fifth Circuit's rationale for
upholding the validity of the patent was that the elements of the combina-
tion patent were so joined as to produce a synergistic effect.t4° Accordingly,
it is not surprising that the Fifth Circuit has endorsed the synergism test.
In John Z0'nk Co. v. National Airoil Burner Corp., 141 the Fifth Circuit found
that the language of Great Atlantic & Pacifi Tea Co., Black Rock, and Sakraida
required a combination patent to achieve a synergistic result as a prerequi-
site to patentability.' 42 The analysis of the patent claims, however, turned
on the Graham standards.
131. Id. at 89.
132. Id. at 88.
133. Id. at 89-92.
134. Id. at 90. The Third Circuit in Sums found support for requiring combination patents
to meet a higher level of patentability in a policy argument. The court reasoned that to grant
combinations a monopoly would restrict the public's access and use of technology which is
already known and available.
135. Id. at 91.
136. Id. at 93.
137. Id. Although the court had earlier noted the dissenting Justices' viewpoint in
Roanwell Corp. v. Plantronics, Inc., 429 U.S. 1004 (1976), the circuit court did not endorse
either the acceptance or the rejection of the synergism test. 608 F.2d at 90-91.
138. 608 F.2d at 93.
139. 474 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1973).
140. Id. at 173.
141. 613 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980). The patent in this'case was for flare burners designed for
efficient smokeless burning of waste gases in gas refinery smoke stacks. The patent was consid-
ered by the expert testimony in the case as a breakthrough in the art. The patent was extremely




In Huron Machine Products v. A. & E Warbern, Inc. ,143 the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's decision that the patent for a special grip plastic
clothes hanger was valid and had been infringed. In considering the defend-
ant's assertion that the patent was invalid for failing the nonobviousness test,
the Fifth Circuit noted with approval the requirement that a combination
patent must achieve a synergistic result.1 44 Dismissing the defendant's con-
tention of obviousness, however, the court found that the patented hanger
was substantially different from the prior art. 145 The court concluded that
the patent represented "the exercise of inventive skill"1 46 and thus satisfied
the requirements for patentability.
Although the court did not analyze the synergism test in either case, nor
did it base its decisions on a finding that a synergism had resulted, its adher-
ence to this test will be of probative value in subsequent patent validity cases
in the Fifth Circuit. 
1
47
4. The Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit has declared that synergism is a required test for
determining the patentability of combinations. In actual practice, however,
the court has not used this requirement to evaluate the validity of any pat-
ent. 148
The Eighth Circuit, in. Reinke Manufacturing Co. v. Sidney Manufacturing
Corp. ,149 applied the Graham standards to determine that the patent at issue
was obvious and therefore invalid. 150 The court concluded that although
the improvements of the patent were desirable features, any "hypothetical"
person skilled in the field could have accomplished the same patented im-
provements by studying the prior art.15 1 The court underscored its adher-
ence to the principles of the synergism test by declaring that in examining
the patent claims, "we will not only consider whether it was obvious that by
putting together the various elements used the result would be the effect
achieved in the [patent]; we will also consider whether the effect is a new
effect, or simply each of the items performing its expected function.'
15 2
143. 615 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1980).
144. Id. at 224. The court expounded that as a precondition to patent validity for a combi-
nation patent, "there must be an unexpected, unusual or synergistic result." Id.
145. Id. at 225. The patent owners had successfully maintained five previous infringement
suits.
146. Id.
147. Robbins Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 554 F.2d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 1977); Whitaker v.
Barwick Indus., 551 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1977).
148. See Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1979); Clark
Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 788 (8th Cir.), cert. dtnjid, 439 U.S. 825 (1978). The Clark
court stated that "in the patent law context, 'synergism' has no talismanic power; synergism is
merely one indication of nonobviousness." Id. at 789.
149. 594 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1979).
150. Id. at 645.
151. Id. at 652.
152. Id. at 648 (emphasis in original).
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5. The District of Columbia Circuit
In Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin Ltd ,153 the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's finding that a patent was
invalid for obviousness.1 54 The synergism discussion was limited to a reply
to the patent owner who argued that the district judge erred in relying on
the absence of synergism to determine patentability. 1 The appellate court
rejected his assertion, countering that the Supreme Court's decision in Sak-
raida adopted this test for combination patents.1 56 The court's decision on
patent invalidity, however, rested on the Graham standards. The court of
appeals stated that the determination of the invention's unpatentability was
conclusive without the use of the synergism test.'
57
C. Questioning The Applicability Of Synergism: Uncertain Conclusions
1. The Second Circuit
Without specifically rejecting the synergism test, the Second Circuit, in
strong language, repudiated any notion that the Supreme Court in Sakraida
had departed from the Graham interpretation of section 103. The court of
appeals declared that
we do not agree with what amounts to an oblique suggestion that
the dicta in the Supreme Court's opinion overruled the statutory
test of nonobviousness established by [section 103] along with the
analytical guidelines for that test established by the Court in Gra-
ham v. John Deere Co. . . . which the opinion in Sakraida cites with
approval.'- 58
The Second Circuit, in Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 59 re-
versed a lower court ruling and held that a patont was invalid for obvi-
ousness. The defendants argued on appeal that the patent was invalid
because it only combined old elements and that predictable combinations
were not patentable.'6° The appellate court, however, in reiterating the es-
tablished test of nonobviousness, stated that an invention is patentable if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art is such that the new device would not have been obvious to a person
skilled in the pertinent art. 161
153. [1980] 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 873.
154. The patent at issue consisted of a device for forming internal grooves in plastic piping.
Id. at 875.
155. Id. at 873.
156. Id. at 874.
157. Id.
158. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 1979). The
Second Circuit, prior to Champion, had not stated whether the circuit approved or disapproved
of synergism. See Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 579 F.2d I (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 867
(1978); Digitronics v. New York Racing Assoc., Inc., 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
860 (1977); and U.S. Philips Corp. v. National Micronetics, Inc., 550 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
159. 603 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1979).
160. Id. at 372.
161. Id.
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The unanimous decision was written by Judge Robert Miller,' 62 who
was sitting by designation from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
Thus, part of the basis for the strong rejection of the synergism test lies in the
patent judges' predilection to gauge patent validity upon statutory merits
and the subsequent guidelines established by Graham rather than on the
Supreme Court's other embellishments of the patent law.'
63
Despite this commitment to the Graham standards, it is not clear
whether this circuit will pursue this preliminary judicial opining on the syn-
ergism question and specifically repudiate the synergism requirement. Hints
about the Second Circuit's future position on this issue perhaps can be
gleaned from decisions at the trial level. A recent district court case, Brennan
v. Mr. Hanger, Inc. ,164 noted the controversy surrounding the synergism ques-
tion and expressed approval of those circuits expressly rejecting the syner-
gism requirement.' 65 Since the district court did not view Champion as
authority on this point,' 66 the opinion made only a half-hearted acknowl-
edgment of the synergism test. Holding that the patent at issue had met the
synergism requirement, the court concluded that "[t]he several elements of
the claimed combination cooperate to produce a highly desirable new result
not theretofore obvious: a hanger bar which is not only cheaper to make but
easier to use. This seems as close to 'synergism' as anyone will ever get with a
mechanical device."'
6 7
162. Judge Miller also was the author of the Tenth Circuit case, Plastic Container Corp. v.
Continental Plastics of Okla., Inc., 607 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 672
(1980). In Plastic, Judge Miller cited his earlier decision in Champion in rejecting the synergism
test. The opinion in Champion does not specifically repudiate synergism as a test for a patent's
validity, but synergism is not included as part of the preconditions to patentability.
163. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) has, with a note of disdain per-
haps, been extremely critical of the Supreme Court's patent opinions. In 1944, the C.C.P.A.
decision, In re Shortell, 142 F.2d 292 (C.C.P.A. 1944), rebuffed the flash of genius test:
While recognizing, of course, that it is the duty of this court to follow the law as
declared by the Supreme Court . . . . it is not within the province of the courts to
establish new standards by which invention is to be determined. It seems clear to us
that the creation of new standards for the determination of what constitutes invention
would be judicial legislation and not judicial interpretation.
Id. at 296. More recently, the C.C.P.A. stated that "the term 'synergism' is applied without
qualification. Synergism, in and of itself, is not conclusive of unobviousness in that synergism
might be expected." Application of Kollman, 595 F.2d 48, 55 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
Judge Rich, author of two articles cited previously, see notes 23 & 71 supra, also disagreed
with the Supreme Court analysis of patent law in Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.
1979). Judge Rich opined that the Supreme Court had misread both the statute and case law in
construing the tests of usefulness, novelty, and nonobviousness.
There are those commentators who criticize the position of the C.C.P.A. and the patent
bar. Their main objection is that the C.C.P.A. and the patent bar have adopted a "liberal"
attitude concerning patentability of small advances over the current technology. These objec-
tors believe inventions that rightfully should be in the public domain have been given patent
protection. Thus, granting monopolies to these inventions reduces the public's access to the
innovation. For a discussion on this position, see Sears, Combination Patents and 35 USC § 103,
1977 DET. C. L. REV. 83; Note, Endorsing the Application of Non-Technical Factual Considerations for
Obviousness Deteminations in Combination Patent Cases-Nickola v. Peterson, 10 TOL. L. REV. 1011
(1979).
164. 479 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
165. Id. at 1224-25.
166. Id. at 1225.
167. Id. Judge Conner offered an alternative to interpreting the synergism definition. He
stated that synergism is "the result produced by the overall combination. Whenever a new and
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2. The Ninth Circuit
Retreating from earlier opinions that had urged the requirement of syn-
ergism, the Ninth Circuit, in Palmer v. Orthoktnetics, Inc. ,168 questioned the
applicability of synergism to the determination of nonobviousness. The
prior decisions of this circuit had held, without comment, that a synergistic
rc.ult must be achieved by combination .atents 169 The reason for this re-
version was the appellate court's recognition that synergism fails to resolve
the question posed by section 103, namely, whether the combination of the
elements in the innovation was obvious in light of the level of skill in the art
at the time the combining was done. 1 70 Noting that the Ninth Circuit's de-
cisions have often held "that a synergism test will assist a court in determin-
ing whether a combination patent is nonobvious," the court asserted that the
final conclusions at the fact finding level "must be guided by the require-
ments of section 103 and Graham v. John Deere Co. "171 The Ninth Circuit
recognized the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Repubc, but reserved judg-
ment on rejecting the synergism test.' 7 2 This qualification, therefore, does
not indicate whether the Ninth Circuit approves or disapproves of syner-
gism.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most that can be concluded from the recent divergence of
opinions is that, from Graham to the subsequent decisions in Black Rock and
Sakraida, the Supreme Court muddied the already turbid waters of judicial
evaluation of patentability under the nonobviousness standard. The nonob-
viousness standard developed from the dissatisfaction with the subjective ju-
dicial "invention" standard. The standards of patentability contained in
section 103 were enacted to promote consistent and definite analysis of pat-
ent claims. Requiring synergism as a condition of patentability would be a
digression from the Graham guidelines and would reintroduce subjective con-
cepts into the adjudication of patent claims.
Additionally, the synergism test is fatally defective in view of the statu-
tory requirements and the interpretation of these requirements in Graham.
The first flaw of the synergism test is that neither section 103 nor Graham
expressly mention synergism. This defect was noted by the Seventh Circuit:
In enacting section 103, Congress expressly mandated nonobvious-
ness, not synergism, as the sole test for the patentability of novel
and useful inventions: indeed, synergism is not even mentioned in
desirable result is achieved, or an old result is achieved more efficiently, synergism is present."
Conner, Winning Patent Infringement Suits-The Art of Swunmzng Agatnst the Tide, in NONOBVioUS-
NESS--THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 4:401,:405 (Witherspoon ed. 1978).
168. 611 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1980).
169. See Kaeiautokomfort v. Eurasian Auto. Prod., 553 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1977); Deere &
Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 513 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914 (1975); Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Tel-Design, Inc., 460 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1972); Regimbal v. Scymansky, 444 F.2d
333 (9th Cir. 1971); Reeves Instrument Corp., v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971).
170. 611 F.2d at 324.
171. Id.
172. Id. at n.17.
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the Patent Act of 1952. Moreover, as section 103 applies to all pat-
ent claims, there is no justification [for] why patentability of a com-
bination patent should be measured by a different standard than
any other type of invention.'
73
A further flaw in the synergism test is that the patent claims are not
evaluated "at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
in the art .... .,174 The synergism test would analyze nonobviousness after
the combination was made, contrary to the section 103 language requiring a
determination of patent validity "at the time the invention was made.,,, 7 5 The
synergism test ignores the possibility that nonobviousness could be found in
the very choice of the elements. The synergism test fails because it focuses on
the result of the combination rather than on the obviousness or nonobvious-
ness of the combination. A rejection of the synergism test does not imply
that there is no place for a synergistic result in the scheme of determining
patent validity. Instead of relying on a synergistic effect as determinative of
patentability, the new result should be considered, as with all other patent
claims, under the nonobviousness standard.
Finally, to resolve the confusion that now exists as a result of the
Supreme Court's holdings and the division in the appellate courts, the Court
should address the question of synergism. If the Court does conclude that a
synergistic result is necessary for combinations to be patentable, then it
should specifically so hold. To promote this additional criterion, the Court
should advance the tests to be used by a reviewing court in evaluating pat-
entability, and it should distinguish the Graham standards from the syner-
gism test. Endorsing the synergistic effect test would substantially increase
the difficulty of obtaining a patent and severely restrict the number of inno-
vations granted patent protection.
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet specifically held that syner-
gism is required, nor should it so hold. Using the Graham three-pronged test,
without requiring an additional standard for combination patents, courts
can still discern whether an innovation merits patent status. The ultimate
fate of the synergism question rests with Congress. Until Congress enacts
legislation prescribing different criteria for combination patents, the federal
courts, in the interest of uniformity, definiteness, and consistency, should
continue to apply the standard of section 103 as it has been interpreted by
Graham.
Hollie L. Baker
173. Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 971 (7th Cir. 1979).
174. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) (emphasis added).
175. Id. (emphasis added).
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